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The 97th General Assembly ended in January without 
passing a pension reform bill; leaving the fate of the 
pension systems in the hands of a new assembly. But 
solving the pension problem will not be any easier for 
this group of legislators. The unfunded liability of the 
state’s five pension systems grew by over $10 billion since 
the 97th assembly started and now exceeds $97 billion; 
including a liability of approximately $19 billion for the 
State University Retirement System (SURS).
The task for the new assembly is clear: it must take 
decisive action this spring to pass a pension reform bill 
that creates a path to fiscal sustainability for the pension 
systems. As is well known, at the crux of the “pension 
crisis” is the state’s failure over many decades to make 
required pension payments. That failure has come home 
to roost and the state is now required to follow a “pension 
ramp” to make additional payments to make up for that 
past underfunding. In addition, the state needs to pay 
off the pension obligation bonds (POB) issued over the 
past decade. These payments—at a time when Illinois’ 
economy continues to be sluggish and the state owes 
billions of dollars in unpaid bills—are crowding out other 
state funding priorities and posing a major fiscal challenge. 
What is required at this time is a path to a solution—a 
plan to stabilize the pension systems. Many legislators, 
groups and individuals—including us—have offered 
suggestions for reforming the pension systems. Here we 
build upon previous suggestions to propose six steps to 
set the State University Retirement System (SURS) on the 
path to fiscal sustainability while ensuring retirement 
security for participants and honoring the constitutional 
guarantee against reducing already accrued benefits.1 
Detailed discussion of the goals and principles motivating 
these proposals and more detailed discussion of some of 
the proposals presented here can be found in two papers 
published last year by the Institute of Government and 
Public Affairs at the University of Illinois.2
 
Our six-step proposal is designed to not only reduce cost 
and bring financial stability to the system but also improve 
the retirement program for universities and colleges. We 
also note at the outset that under our proposal, in the long-
run (after existing unfunded liabilities have been paid off 
and after our proposed new “hybrid” system is fully in 
place), the state’s obligation for ongoing pension funding 
will be de minimis. Over time, the direct employers—the 
1 While our proposal is structured in the context of SURS—to which all of us 
belong—our suggestions are relevant for the other pension systems as well.
2 Fiscal Sustainability and Retirement Security: A Reform Proposal for the Illinois 
State Universities Retirement System (SURS), Jeffrey Brown and Robert F. 
Rich, February 8, 2012; A Time for Action: Reforming the State University 
Retirement System, Jeffrey Brown, Steven Cunningham, Avijit Ghosh, and 
Scott Weisbenner, December 10, 2012.
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65 universities and colleges who are part of SURS—
and their employees will accept the bulk of the funding 
burden, as institutions around the country already do. In 
return, each employer will have much more flexibility 
to adapt the basic retirement plan structure to meet its 
particular needs.    
The steps in our proposal fall into three broad categories. 
In the first section of the document, we discuss steps to 
reduce the normal cost and liabilities of the Tier I defined 
benefit plan. Next, we focus on how the pension system 
should be funded. Our final step is to institute a “hybrid” 
system to replace the Tier II program for current employees. 
The inadequacies of the Tier II system put Illinois public 
universities at a serious disadvantage compared to their 
out-of-state peers and threaten the continued vitality 
of higher education in Illinois; no pension reform plan 
would be complete without addressing Tier II reform. 
I. Reducing Costs and Liabilities
The first steps we propose would revise how the annual 
increase in the annuity paid to retirees and the effective 
rate of interest are calculated. These steps will reduce the 
normal cost of the Tier I pension program going forward 
and also reduce the current liabilities of the system.
Annual Annuity Increase
The provision of the current pension plan that has 
received the greatest attention is the automatic annual 
adjustment to the retirement annuity; typically referred 
to as the cost of living adjustment, or COLA. The current 
provision guarantees that the retirement annuity increases 
at a compounded rate of 3% annually. As we have noted 
elsewhere, when this provision was introduced in 1990 the 
state did not consider the full cost of providing this benefit 
and increased the benefit without adjusting employee 
contributions.3 Given the high cost of this provision, 
it is not surprising that pension reform proposals have 
focused on inducing or forcing participants to accept a 
smaller increase. For example, some bills have suggested 
that retirees and current employees choose between a 
lower level of increase or forego access to state provided 
retiree health care. Other bills would limit the annual 
increase to the first $25,000 of the annuity.
There has been little discussion of the fact that as 
currently structured this benefit is not really a cost of 
living adjustment (COLA), since it is not linked to actual 
inflation rate. It is simply a guaranteed 3% increase in 
annuity irrespective of whether inflation is 1%, 7%, 10% 
or -1%. During times when inflation is low—as has been 
the case for some time now—retirees receive a windfall. 
On the other hand—generous as it may seem now—the 
3 Brown, Cunningham, Ghosh and Weisbenner; op. cit.
COLA provision will not adequately protect the retiree’s 
purchasing power during periods of high inflation. 
Consider, for instance, the period from 1973 to 1982: 
inflation was higher than 6% in nine of the 10 years during 
this period and it exceeded the 10% mark in four of those 
years. SURS retirees would have lost a significant portion 
of their purchasing power despite what now seems like a 
generous benefit provision.  
The truth is that the current COLA provision offers no 
protection against high inflation—which is an essential 
feature of any good pension system. It is for this reason 
that we believe that annuity increases should be linked to 
some measure correlated with inflation. Linking COLA 
to inflation will also reduce the cost of providing the 
increases during periods of low inflation. Costs would 
increase when inflation is high; but the impact of this 
higher cost is mitigated by the fact that the state’s tax base, 
and thus the state’s tax revenue, rises more quickly when 
inflation is high. In our view, it would be constitutionally 
permissible to reduce the expected average future 
increase in exchange for the valuable insurance protection 
that individuals would receive during periods of high 
inflation.
Effective Rate of Interest (ERI)
A little understood feature of the SURS pension system is 
the “Effective Rate of Interest” or ERI. The annual interest 
rate is not mandated by the constitution but is set each 
year by the SURS Board and the State Comptroller. As 
Brown and Rich had noted a year ago, the ERI, which is 
currently set at 7.5%, has historically shown very little 
variability.4 Thus the ERI established by the SURS Board 
has included a significant risk-premium for what is 
essentially a risk-free return to the participants. This in 
essence represents a hidden subsidy in money purchase 
benefit calculations, portable plan refunds, purchase of 
service credits and refund of excess contributions.5
To eliminate such subsidies the ERI should be pegged to 
4 Brown and Rich, op.cit.
5 Due to this subsidy the money purchase option is equivalent to a defined 
contribution plan in which participants are completely shielded from mar-
ket risk yet paid the equivalent of risky market returns. Tier I participants 
who started employment after July 1, 2005 are not entitled to benefits 
under the money purchase formula.
STEP #1
The retirement annuity of current and future retirees 
will increase annually by one-half of the unadjusted 
percentage increase (but not less than zero) in the 
consumer price index-u in the previous twelve months, 
compounded upon the preceding year’s annuity.
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the yield of long-term government bonds with a small 
premium added. This would be the commensurate return 
for an essentially risk-free asset. At the same time the 
change would significantly reduce both the accumulated 
liabilities of the system and the annual cost going forward. 
It is important to note that the lower ERI has no effect on the 
defined benefit of 2.2 percent of income for each year of service 
to which Tier I participants are entitled.
We also urge that other administrative rules such as those 
used to calculate survivor benefits when annuitizing 
money purchase benefits should be examined with an 
eye towards increasing transparency and comparability 
to market returns. 
II. Sharing the Funding Liability
As we have stated earlier, at its core, the challenge to 
the pension problem is one of funding. Simply stated, 
the state seems to lack the wherewithal to make the 
required payments to the pension system to amortize 
past underfunding and fund the annual normal cost. The 
annual normal cost is currently shared by the employees 
and the state.6 Consistent with a number of other 
proposals we suggest that the direct employers of SURS 
participants—public universities and colleges—should 
also contribute toward paying the normal cost. We also 
propose that Tier I employees increase their share of the 
normal cost. In exchange for accepting a larger share 
of the financial burden, employers and employees will 
receive the valuable right to enforce the state’s pension 
funding obligation through the legal system. 
The pension reform legislations debated by the 97th 
General Assembly included normal cost shifts as 
part of the solution. Although some have suggested 
eliminating this provision, we strongly believe that it 
should be retained. The provision will not only ease the 
state’s financial burden but also appropriately align the 
incentives of employers to consider the cost of retirement 
benefits when making hiring and compensation 
decisions. As we have stated elsewhere, the employers 
6 The annual normal cost is the actuarial estimate of the present value of 
the benefits accrued by participants each year.
need to have a “skin in the pension game.”7 By ignoring 
pension cost, employers underestimate the true cost of 
their hiring decisions. Cost transfer will also provide 
employees greater assurance that the required payments 
will be made in a timely manner. However, to avoid 
one-time budget shock for universities and colleges, the 
cost shift should be phased in gradually over a period of 
several years. In a letter addressed to the Governor and 
the legislative leaders, the Presidents and Chancellors of 
Illinois public universities agreed to a “limited” transfer 
of normal cost if the state maintained at least the current 
level of state appropriations to their institutions.8
To further ease the state’s funding burden and in the 
spirit of shared sacrifice, we also propose that employee 
contributions to the plan be increased from the current 
8% level to 10% of pensionable income over a two-year 
period (for Tier I participants in the traditional and 
portable plans only). A similar proposal has also been 
made by “We Are One,” a coalition of labor organizations 
in the state.9 It should be recognized, however, that courts 
in some states have ruled against increased employee 
contributions without additional benefits, which is why 
this proposal must be specifically linked to the granting 
of appropriate legal rights to participants to hold the state 
accountable for its funding commitments.
An important aspect of pension reform is for the state to 
fill up the hole left by past underfunding by amortizing 
the unfunded liabilities (in addition to funding the state’s 
share of the normal cost each year). To instill confidence 
in the pension system, the state must ensure a steady flow 
of funds in accordance with an agreed-upon schedule of 
payments. Some have suggested replacing the payment 
schedule passed by the legislators in 1995 with one 
that achieves 100% funding in 30 years. While this is a 
laudable goal, what is more important than the 30-year 
timeline is a steady stream of funding at an agreed upon 
rate and improving the funding ratio steadily.
Regular and full payments in accordance with an agreed 
upon payment schedule that steadily improves the 
funding ratio will raise confidence in the system even if 
it takes longer to achieve 100% funding. It is important, 
however, that the payment schedule is calculated based 
upon a straight-line amortization of the current unfunded 
liabilities using a closed amortization period. This would 
correct two important deficiencies of the payment 
schedule adopted in 1995. First, in contrast to the current 
schedule, which concentrates the bulk of the payments 
in the later years—especially post 2035—straight-line 
amortization would require equal payments each year. 
Second, in the closed amortization period method all the 
current unfunded accrued liability would be paid off in 
7 Brown, Cunningham, Ghosh and Weisbenner; op. cit.
8 Letter dated May 3, 2012.
9 http//www.weareoneillinois.org
STEP #2
Going forward, Effective Rate of Interest (ERI) for 
all purposes, including the money purchase benefit 
formula, portable lump sum refunds, purchase of 
service credits and returns of excess contribution will 
be set to a value equivalent to 75 basis points above the 
interest paid by 30-year U.S. Treasury Bonds.
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full by the end of the agreed upon date. Together these 
features would increase confidence in the system and also 
reduce overall cost to the state in real terms. Specifically, 
we propose three funding related steps:
III. Revised Retirement Plan 
for New Employees
No pension reform will be complete without rectifying 
the problems in the Tier II plan that went into effect 
on January 1, 2011. Thus, our proposed final step is to 
replace the current Tier II program with a “hybrid” plan 
that includes both defined benefit (DB) and defined 
contribution (DC) components. Integrating DB and DC 
components into a single retirement program helps to 
balance the pros and cons of each system individually. The 
DB component provides lifetime retirement security for 
participants, while the DC component, like 401(k) plans, 
allows participants more control over their retirement 
resources while controlling liabilities for the state and the 
employers.10 Our proposed plan will allow universities 
and colleges to compete for talent and improve retirement 
security for their employees while still reducing the fiscal 
burden to the state. 
Below we present some of the salient features of the 
proposed plan. The features are designed to promote 
retirement security including a benefit that cannot be 
outlived, mandatory participation, shared financing, 
shared risks and flexibility for each university or college 
to tailor the program to the needs of its own work force.
The retirement plan for new employees will comprise 
both a defined benefit plan and a defined contribution 
plan; all members will be enrolled in both components 
of the plan. The plan will also be available to Tier I and 
Tier II members. If a member with accrued benefit under 
any existing plan elects to transfer to the new plan, all 
benefits earned under existing plan with respect to 
service completed prior to the transfer will be preserved. 
All creditable service already completed under the state 
pension system shall count for purposes of determining 
retirement eligibility and vesting under the new plan. 
The features of the proposed “hybrid” plan include:  
a. The defined benefit plan:  Upon eligibility for 
retirement, members will receive 1.5 % of final average 
salary, up to the Social Security maximum taxable 
earnings level at that time ($113,700 in 2013) for each 
year of service credit earned while they are a member 
of this plan. 
10 For a more detailed discussion of the advantages of the hybrid system 
see Brown and Rich, op.cit. See also NASRA Issue Briefs: State Hybrid 
Retirement Plans I and II, November 2011 and August 2012, 
www.nasra.org/resources
STEP #3
Universities and colleges will contribute up to 6.2% 
of the pension eligible payroll of their employees to 
fund the annual normal cost. The cost shift will be 
transitioned at a rate of 0.5% of pensionable pay per 
year for the first eleven years and 0.7% the twelfth year. 
STEP #4
All employees enrolled in the Tier I defined benefit 
program will contribute an additional 2% of pay 
towards pension cost at a rate of an additional 0.5% 
of pay a year for the next four years. The additional 
employee contribution will not be included in the 
calculation of benefits under the Money Purchase Plan.
STEP #5
In return for the above cost-shifting, the state shall be 
required to amortize the current unfunded liabilities 
of SURS in accordance with a payment schedule 
that steadily improves the funding ratio and is 
calculated based on a straight line amortization of the 
current unfunded liabilities with a reasonable closed 
amortization period. Furthermore, the state shall be 
contractually obligated to contribute to the pension 
system each year the full amount of all its payment 
obligations. If the state fails to make full payment, the 
pension system or any of its members may take legal 
action to compel the state to make that payment.
STEP #6
Any new employee who becomes a member of SURS 
will participate in a hybrid plan comprising a defined 
benefit (DB) and an individual defined contribution 
(DC) plan. The current retirement plans—Tier II plan 
and Self-Managed Plan—will no longer be offered 
to new employees. Any employee who is currently a 
member of SURS can elect to terminate participation in 
their current plan and elect to have retirement benefits 
of future creditable service provided under the new 
retirement plan. The irrevocable choice must be made 
during the six-month period following the effective 
date of the new plan.
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b. Final average salary:  “Final average salary” means 
the average monthly salary obtained by dividing the 
total salary of the participant during the 96 consecutive 
months of service within the last 120 months of service 
in which the total compensation was the highest by 
the number of months of service in that period. The 
final average salary of participants who have been a 
member of the system for less than 96 months means 
the average monthly salary during the entire period 
of employment. In all cases, only salary below the 
maximum earnings level specified in Item ‘a’ above 
will be included.   
c. Self-managed (defined contribution) plan:  Each 
member will also be automatically enrolled in a defined 
contribution plan established by the system, which 
shall offer members the opportunity to accumulate 
assets for retirement through a combination of member 
and employer contributions that may be invested in 
mutual funds, collective investment funds, or other 
investment products in a self-managed fund. The 
plan must be qualified under the Internal Revenue 
Services Act and contributions can be made up to the 
maximum amount allowed by the act. As noted below, 
this defined contribution plan will be funded by a mix 
of both mandatory and voluntary contributions from 
both employers and employees.
d. Payments:  Each employee will be required to 
contribute 8% of his or her pensionable salary to the 
plan each year; based on the Social Security maximum 
taxable earnings level at the time. One-third of this 
amount shall be credited to the employee’s self 
managed (DC) plan and the rest towards the cost of 
the defined benefit plan. The employee’s contribution 
shall be deducted from the employee’s salary and will 
be a condition of employment.
 
The state shall be responsible for the remaining portion 
of the normal cost of the defined benefit component of 
the plan. Consistent with normal cost shift described 
earlier (Step 3), the state’s normal cost obligations 
will be transitioned to the universities and colleges 
at the same rate as that described before. In this 
case, however, we expect the state’s obligations to be 
completely shifted to the direct employers at the end 
of the transition period.  
In addition to funding the normal cost of the defined 
benefit portion as described above, universities 
and colleges will also make a mandatory annual 
contribution equal to 1% of total pensionable pay to 
the DC account of each employee.
e. Supplementary DC Contributions:  In addition to the 
above funding, each university or college will have the 
flexibility of making additional employer/employee 
contributions to the DC plan. This could take the 
form of additional fixed or matching contributions 
by employers and voluntary contributions by 
employees. Employers will have the flexibility to vary 
the contribution amounts in order to optimize their 
human resource goals related to their own workforce 
recruitment and retention needs in a manner consistent 
with all applicable laws. 
f. Vesting:  Employee contributions to the plan, including 
the accrued rate of return attributable to contributions 
to the DC component, shall always be vested with the 
employee. State and university contributions to both 
components of the plan, including the accrued rate of 
return attributable to state and employer contributions 
to the DC component, shall be vested with the 
employee in the following manner: upon completing 
two years of service the member will be vested with 
20% of the amount. For each additional year of service 
the member will be vested with an additional 20% of 
the amount. Members with six or more years of service 
will receive the total amount.  
g. Cost of living adjustment:   A member’s defined 
benefit annuity will increase annually on the January 1 
occurring either on or after the attainment of age 67 or 
the first anniversary of the annuity start date, whichever 
is later.  Each annual increase shall be calculated as 
one-half the annual unadjusted percentage increase 
(but not less than zero) in the consumer price index-u, 
compounded upon the preceding year’s annuity.  
h. All other aspects of the program including 
parameters governing retirement eligibility, penalties 
for early retirement, disability payments and survivor 
benefits will be similar to the corresponding parameters 
governing the Tier II program.
IV. Impact of Proposals
Any meaningful pension reform proposal must improve 
the financial stability of the system while honoring the 
constitutional guarantee against reducing already accrued 
benefits. The proposal presented here achieves this goal. 
It reduces the normal cost and the current liabilities of 
the system, shifts the responsibility for paying a portion 
of the normal cost and then creates a legal obligation for 
the state to make timely payments to recover from past 
underfunding and fund the remaining normal cost.
Taken together the steps we propose will significantly 
reduce SURS’ $19.3 billion unfunded liability as well as 
the annual cost of the pension system going forward. For 
example, changing the ERI going forward to 4% is likely 
to reduce SUR’s unfunded liabilities by more than 5%. 
Linking the annual annuity increase to the inflation rate 
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will reduce the liability even further.  Both steps will also 
reduce the annual normal cost of the pension system. 
The transition of normal cost to universities and colleges 
in accordance with Step 3 will reduce the state’s required 
normal cost payments to SURS between 2014 and 2045 by 
more than 70%. This is a conservative estimate since it does 
not include additional contributions from Tier I employees; 
nor does it consider the reduction in normal cost achieved 
by other the steps of our proposal. Finally, the hybrid plan 
is designed with an eye toward not increasing the cost to 
the state in the short term and over time transitioning cost 
to universities and colleges. It also allows each institution 
to design a retirement system that best suits its own needs. 
The plan will help Illinois public universities and colleges 
recruit and retain the talent they need.
Taken together as a package, the steps we propose will 
significantly reduce the state’s funding obligation to 
SURS and allow the state to make timely payments to 
fulfill the remaining funding obligations. This will instill 
confidence in the system and sustain it for the long term. 
V. A Concluding Note
A comprehensive pension reform proposal has eluded 
Illinois legislators for two years. But delay will not make 
the problem easier or make it go away. The package of 
reforms presented here offers a credible path to a fair, 
equitable and feasible pension reform. Now it is time 
for action. Each passing day makes the problem more 
challenging and threatens the continued excellence of 
higher education in Illinois that has taken generations to 
build. The long run vitality of the state of Illinois depends 
upon action now.
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Step Summary Impact
1
A member’s retirement annuity will increase annually by one-half 
the unadjusted percentage increase (but not less than zero) in the 
consumer price index-u
Reduces normal cost going forward
Reduces unfunded liabilities 
2 Effective Rate of Interest will be set to a value equivalent to 75 basis points above the interest paid by 30-year U.S. Treasury Bonds
Reduces normal cost going forward
Reduces unfunded liabilities 
3
Universities and colleges will contribute up to 6.2% of the pension 
eligible payroll of their employees to fund the annual normal cost. 
The cost shift will be transitioned over a 12-year period
Reduces normal cost payment 
obligations for the state
4
All employees enrolled in the Tier I defined benefit program will 
contribute an additional 2% of pay towards pension cost transitioned 
over a 4-year period
Reduces normal cost payment 
obligations for the state
5
The state shall be required to amortize the current unfunded liabilities 
of SURS in accordance with a payment schedule calculated based on 
a straight-line amortization of the current unfunded liabilities with a 
reasonable closed amortization period. If the state fails to make full 
payment, the pension system or any of its members may take legal 
action to compel the state to make that payment
Assures long term funding and 
amortization of unfunded liabilities
6
All new employees who become a member of SURS will participate 
in a hybrid plan comprising a defined benefit (DB) and an individual 
defined contribution (DC) plan
Reduces state normal cost payments 
by shifting costs to universities and 
colleges. Institutions gain flexibility to 
design system to fit their own needs
